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Table of Abbreviations
art.      article 
Commission     European Commission 
EU (also: Union)    European Union 
FE      fixed establishment 
IR      Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 
      of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures 
      for Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of 
      value added tax
MS       Member State
RVD (also: Recast or VAT Directive) Recast Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system 
      of value added tax
Second Directive    Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC of 11 April 1967 
      on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States 
      concerning turnover taxes – Structure and procedures 
      for application of the common system of value added 
      tax
Sixth Directive     Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 
      17 May 1977 on the harmonization of 
      the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes 
      - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of 
      assessment
TFEU      the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
VAT       Value Added Tax
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1. Introduction
In the world where 60% of cross-border trade in the European Union (EU) is internal1 we live and 
trade linked by global connections and dependent on endless organisational networks. Hence, it 
becomes necessary to legally recognise and facilitate cooperation between different corporate 
actors. Within the sphere of VAT legally independent but  cooperating companies are as a rule of 
thumb treated separately. However, for VAT purposes two levels interdependence have been 
recognised. The European legislator conceived of an exemption to deal with unassociated 
companies (independent groups of persons) by the way of art.132(1)(f) RVD and established a 
grouping mechanism for closely linked companies by the way of art.11 RVD. While those 
legislative attempts deserve due recognition it is important to critically assess their consistency with 
the doctrine, general system of VAT and practical implications with the view to make the system of 
VAT consistent and hence, efficient. 
This thesis is concerned with closely linked companies and the way in which so called ‘VAT 
groups’ are treated for VAT purposes. The author reviews contemporary problems stemming from 
the actual treatment of art.11 RVD (de lege lata) and offers a preferred treatment (de lege ferenda) 
of VAT groups given the meaning of ‘person’ for VAT purposes and the logic of the VAT system.
1.1. Objectives, methods and disposition of this paper
This paper looks at the current treatment of VAT groups under art.11 and points out selected 
problems that emerge from the wording or application of the provision. It aims to catalogue the 
most burning issues (independently selected by the author) and analyze them to flag problematic 
areas and lay ground for the overhaul of the provision. Moreover, the author will examine the 
concept of a ‘person’ in the VAT directive and look at the system of VAT as a whole in search of the 
proper scope of VAT groups and will suggest proper treatment.
For this purpose, section 2 of this paper provides a brief overview of VAT groups while section 3 
furnishes a non-exhaustive inventory of issues related to VAT groups stemming either from the 
wording of the art.11 itself or national transposition in the MS. Six main issues will be identified. 
Section 4 examines the wording of art.11, its legislative history, objectives and context (both in 
terms of legislative intent and textual context of Title III) with the view to determine who, how and 
under what conditions may belong to a VAT group. Next, section 5 applies the conclusions of 
section 4 to problems identified in section 3. It  identifies which problems can be eradicated just by 
proper interpretation of the directive and which require further legislative action. It also 
acknowledges problems which will remain despite further legislation and lists them. Finally, section 
6 offers a summary and a proposal for reform.
1.2. Delimitations
The author takes the liberty  to select issues related to VAT groups and does not aim to 
comprehensively cover all the issues posed by the VAT group regulation.
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1 B. Terra and J. Kajus, 2011, A Guide to the European VAT Directives. Introduction to European VAT. Vol 1. 
Amsterdam/Hornbaek: IBFD, p. 98;
Moreover, the author does not try to establish whether VAT groups are the best mechanism to deal 
with associated or connected companies. She rather attempts to find the preferred, improved version 
of the present treatment.
2. VAT groups - overview
2.1. Place of VAT groups in the VAT system
Value Added Tax (VAT) is a tax on consumption expenditure levied on all stages of production of 
most goods and services. The burden of VAT is shifted to the ultimate consumer by the deduction 
system which ensures neutrality  of VAT -- output VAT is chargeable after deduction of input VAT 
borne directly by the various cost components on each transaction. The system of European VAT is 
currently regulated by the Recast Directive (RVD) together with the Implementing Regulation (IR).  
The Recast Directive contains a single, yet multilayered, facultative provision enabling the 
existence and registration of VAT groups in a Member State. Art.11 provides that any independent 
persons who are linked by economic, financial and organisational ties may be considered as a single 
taxable person for VAT purposes. Those persons however, must be confined to a single jurisdiction 
(territoriality criterium). Member States who decide to exercise this option must previously consult 
the VAT Committee and may adopt additional arrangements to prevent tax abuse related to VAT 
groups. Art.11 reads as follows:
“ (1) After consulting the advisory  committee on value added tax (hereafter, the "VAT Committee"), 
each Member State may regard as a single taxable person any  persons established in the territory of 
that Member State who, while legally  independent, are closely bound to one another by  financial, 
economic and organisational links.
(2) A Member State exercising the option provided for in the first paragraph, may adopt any 
measures needed to prevent tax evasion or avoidance through the use of this provision.”
The concept of a VAT grouping can be traced back to the German Organshaft which embodies the 
idea that substance should prevail over legal form and that companies which are technically 
independent but practically  related should be treated as one2. However, the concept only formally 
materialized in the EU legislation through the Sixth Directive in 1978. The groups, introduced with 
the view to simplify the system and prevent abuse by artificially  splitting the enterprise to benefit 
from the small enterprise scheme have since been subject to serious critique by the Commission 
which attempted to abolish them in 1995. In its’ recent document, Commission’s communication 
from 2011, Commission reiterates its’ commitment to get  rid of art.113  on the ground that VAT 
groups create competition between MS and affect fiscal neutrality  in the internal market. Despite 
Commission’s resistance the trend has been to adopt VAT group  provision4. The reason for this lies 
6
2 C. Amand, “VAT Grouping, FCE Bank and Force of Attraction - the Internal Market is Leaking”, International VAT 
Monitor, July/August 2007, p. 238;
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and 
Social Committee on the future of VAT Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system tailored to the single 
market Brussels, 6.12.2011 COM(2011) 851 final, p.16;
4 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the VAT group option provided 
for in Article 11 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax Brussels, 2.7.2009 COM
(2009) 325 final, p.2;
in vast advantages for taxpayers and hope that  administrative simplicity will attract foreign 
investment.
2.2. Advantages and disadvantages of VAT groups
2.2.1. To the taxpayer
VAT groups give independent companies cash flow advantages only comparable to those of a single 
company and simplify VAT administration for the taxpayer. Transactions within a group of 
companies are VAT neutral (just as transactions between fully taxable persons B2B) which enables 
companies to provide goods and services internally without being engaged in the deduction 
procedure. A group can avoid delays both from the supplier’s customer’s and tax authority’s end (in 
the event of excess input and refund). Also intra-group  transactions do not have to be accounted for 
unless otherwise required (e.g. by the self-supply  regulations). A single VAT registration number for 
the whole group  as well as a single tax representative responsible for administrative obligations 
(head of the group) make administrative compliance easier for most members of the group who are 
at least partially relieved from the burden of dealing with the Tax Authority. Those ‘legitimate’ 
advantages are however also coupled with certain advantages which the legislator did not intend to 
confer on a taxpayer. Those relate to deduction. Under VAT grouping provision and in accordance 
with case law5 it is possible to include persons with no or partial right to deduct input VAT. This 
possibility enables to effectively partially deduct VAT on taxed supplies which are used to produce 
exempt supplies giving the taxpayer the advantage which he would have not received had the group 
not existed6. However, while some groups might benefit from ‘enhanced’ ability  to deduct groups 
which wholly consist of taxable persons can suffer from only partial deduction of overhead VAT 
when supplies are acquired for the benefit of the whole group. 
Disadvantages of group registration are rather minimal. It  could be argued that the initial difficulty 
to transition from a number of separate taxable persons to one and related to it, the problem to 
adjust bookkeeping and adopt international accounting standards are problematic but this is true for 
all the organisational changes. Therefore, disadvantages are not unique to groups and hence, 
marginal.
2.2.2. To the revenue
VAT groups are a cause of decreased revenue collection. The transactions that would have been 
taxable now escape the net of VAT and the transactions that would have not enjoyed a deduction 
now get a partial deduction. Furthermore, even despite reduced administrative burden related to 
processing fewer returns and managing fewer files VAT groups complicate the system and open the 
doors for illicit tax avoidance. Ergo, since groups enhance the plasticity of the VAT system by 
providing additional outlets for tax structuring they enable the taxpayer to ‘play’ with the group 
registration as to obtain a tax advantage. Swinkles lists a fair few tax avoidance schemes exploiting 
art.117. The possibility of abuse is however not a problem unique to VAT groups and art.11(2) 
contains a anti-avoidance measure which prevents the occurrence of abuse. There are also other 
7
5 C‑85/11 Commission v Ireland;
6 J. Swinkles, “The Phenomenon of VAT Groups under EU Law and Their VAT-Saving Aspects”, International VAT 
Monitor, January/February 2010, p.39;
7 Ibid., pp.39-40;
measures, such as ECJ case law in the Halifax8 case, which target avoidance. Therefore, it  is not 
clear whether VAT groups are indeed a major cause of avoidance; this issue is to be resolved 
empirically.
However, a study shows that introduction of VAT groups results in long term benefits such as 
increased employment in the region and inflow of new investors9. VAT groups facilitate outsourcing 
which on the other hand enables to realize economies of scale and increase GDP of a country 10. 
2.3. Implementation of VAT groups across the Union 
Implementation of art.11 varies widely on many levels11. Some countries have not adopted the 
provision at  all (Poland, Luxembourg) while those that did vary substantially in ways they did so. 
Some have made VAT groups mandatory (Netherlands, Austria) while others have kept them 
voluntary for the taxpayers to opt in (Czech Republic, Belgium). Others have limited VAT groups to 
certain sectors (Sweden) or certain types of taxable persons (for example, exempt persons12). The 
tests which MS use to interpret sufficient economic, financial and organizational ties for VAT 
grouping purposes13 vary from country to country despite guidance from the Commission14. 
Moreover, the MS are divided in the way they adopted the judgement in FCE Bank15 which says 
that a branch and head office are one taxable person for VAT purposes and hence, VAT neutral for 
intra-transaction purposes. In the context of international VAT groups FCE Bank has been adopted 
wholly (UK, Netherlands), partially (Finland, Cyprus) or not at all (Slovakia, Hungary)16 in the MS 
which changes the way  in which territoriality criterium in art.11 is interpreted (see section 5.1 for 
further discussion). 
Divergent interpretation of art.11 is not in itself problematic. For example the fact that certain 
countries impose compulsory registration of VAT groups does fit within the discretion afforded by 
the art.11. MS can adopt measures which tackle tax avoidance and prevent distortion of competition 
and hence, MS are at liberty to impose additional limitations or requirements to that effect (as 
exemplified recently  in the Commission v Sweden17 case where Sweden was allowed to limit VAT 
8
8 C-255/02;
9 E. Matyszewska, “Grupa VAT ulatwi rozliczenia”, Gazeta Prawna, 18.11.2011;
10 T. Rzepa and M. Wyganowski, “VAT Grouping and Cost-Sharing Agreements - The Polish Experience”, International 
VAT Monitor, July/August 2012, p.252;
11 K. Vyncke, “VAT Grouping in the European Union: Purposes and Limitations”, International VAT Monitor, July/
August 2007, p.255;
12 Ibid, p.255;
13 I. Massin and K. Vyncke, “EC Communication on VAT Grouping: An Attempt to Harmonize or to Restrict the Use of 
Group Registration?”, International VAT Monitor, November/December 2009, p.457;
14 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the VAT group option provided 
for in Article 11 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax Brussels, 2.7.2009 COM
(2009) 325 final, p.8;
15 C-210/04;
16 L. Bijl et al. “EU VAT Grouping Provisions: Update”, Issue 5, August 2012, p.34;
17 Case C-480/10;
registration to companies acting in financial and insurance sectors for, arguably, the reasons 
countering tax avoidance). Furthermore, MS are allowed to take steps on the issues which the 
provision is silent about, such as group registration, provided they are in line with the purpose of the 
provision. The problem however arises when countries use the provision in a discriminatory  or 
selective manner or when the divergences in implementation between countries are too big to 
tolerate. Within the field of a harmonized tax such as VAT radical discrepancies are particularly 
unwelcome because they affect the internal market and disrupt competition. In the next section the 
author will address those discrepancies in implementation which pose particularly unwelcome 
problems together with those issues which flow from the explicit wording of art.11 itself. 
3. Actual treatment of VAT groups - Inventory of problems
3.1. Territoriality and the (in)ability to form cross-border VAT groups
Art.11 provides that VAT groups can be formed by persons “established in the territory of that 
Member State”. This territorial restriction is controversial on many levels which can be summarized 
in the following points:
1) It is unclear what it  means to be “established” for the purposes of art.11. The circumstances 
under which a person is established in a MS can be understood to the effect that “being established” 
refers to either: 1) resident taxable persons only, or 2) resident taxable persons and resident FEs of 
non-resident taxable persons, or 3) resident taxable persons and non-resident taxable persons having 
a resident FE.  
This “territoriality  criterium” yields itself to two plausible interpretations. Under literal 
interpretation establishment ought to be interpreted to the effect  that  only companies which are 
physically present in the territory  of the MS which adopted VAT groups are established within the 
meaning of the provision. This reading of the provision is strongly preferred by the European 
Commission and means that VAT groups exclude secondary establishments of resident taxable 
persons but can include secondary  establishments of non-resident  persons. Consequently, territorial 
criterium restricts the exercise of freedom of establishment under art.49 TFEU. Some authors18 
have argued that it can be however justified by the need to preserve cohesion of the tax system or 
by the application of the fiscal principle of territoriality  but have also maintained that there is a slim 
chance that the restriction would pass the proportionality test. However, an alternative interpretation 
of “establishment” is possible. Interpretation in light of ECJ case law, in particular the judgement in 
FCE Bank, allows to relax the strict wording of art.11. In synthesis, as pointed out above, ECJ in 
FCE Bank held that  a head office and an overseas branch should be treated as one taxable person 
for VAT purposes. This means that foreign secondary  establishments of a persons established in a 
country  which adopted VAT group  regime must be subsumed under VAT group structure which the 
primary establishment participates in. Interpretation in light of FCE Bank allows to create cross-
border VAT groups provided it  is proven that an overseas establishment is indeed a fixed 
9
18 A. van Doesum et al. “Internal Market and VAT: Intra-group Transactions of Branches, Subsidiaries and VAT 
Groups”, EC Tax. Rev. 2007/1, p.38-39; R. Zuidgeest, “Cross-Border VAT Grouping”, International VAT Monitor, 
January/February 2010, p.29;
establishment and that this FE is not a separate taxable person19. MS apply the judgement in respect 
to VAT groups differently  and as a consequence engage in harmful tax competition which distorts 
the internal market and facilitates abusive practices. The issues connected to varying 
implementation of FCE Bank will be addressed later in this paper (see section 3.2).
 
2) Territorial restriction understood literally distorts tax neutrality because it puts multinational 
companies at a disadvantage in relation to companies which act within a single jurisdiction.
3) VAT groups become a tool of tax competition between MS. The idea behind is that the MS which 
adopted art.11 becomes more attractive for businesses than those which did not. Since the territorial 
restriction operates the MS can now tax the transactions which he could not tax before either 
because the company would have not migrated to the MS at all had the VAT groups not been 
available there or because he can now tax transactions which would have not been taxable before 
the groups was established on its territory  (i.e. transactions between a domestic head office and a 
non-resident FE become taxable when the head office or the FE joins a VAT group in their 
respective country according to Commission’s Recommendation20). Moreover, varying 
implementation of the judgement of FCE Bank creates further opportunity for tax competition. 
It is unlikely  that ECJ will revise the criterium of territoriality  and declare it to be an unjustified or 
justified yet disproportionate restriction on the freedom of establishment despite the fact that  there 
are strong arguments to that end. The restriction is encoded in the VAT Directive itself and even 
though secondary Union legislation must respect the principle of subsidiarity and not be contrary to 
primary Union law there is compelling evidence that unless the Union legislator abolishes art.11 all 
together or gives it a significant overhaul the provision will stand as it is. Case law21 indicates that 
unless the restriction found in secondary  legislation is “so significant and so obvious that it  cannot 
be tolerated by the EU’s legal order”22 it will not be taken down by the ECJ.
3.2. Implementation of FCE Bank
The judgement in FCE Bank threw a curveball to anyone engaged with VAT groups. Apart from the 
aforementioned issues regarding the definition of “establishment” for the purposes of art.11 the 
judgement provoked an unsettling proposition -- a proposition that art.11 establishes a special 
person or a special scheme in the form of VAT grouping for VAT purposes and if so, group 
registration modifies the relationship  between a group and foreign FEs of members of the group. To 
find that a VAT group benefits from a special status is to reconcile the territorial restriction of art.11 
and ECJ case law; it is a solution to a complex situation where EU legislator and ECJ are, as 
appears to the author, at odds. The author will briefly  deal with this proposition in section 4 of this 
10
19 The ECJ jurisprudence (e.g. DFDS case) regarding the concept of fixed establishment suggests that a branch can 
constitute a separate taxable person provided it has sufficient independence and bears economic risks on its own 
account. However, a branch constitutes a single taxable person with its head office unless the contrary conclusion is 
proven. 
20 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the VAT group option provided 
for in Article 11 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax Brussels, 2.7.2009 COM
(2009) 325 final, p.8;
21 Case C-475/01, Commission v. Greece (Ouzo), para. 19. See also Case C-137/92 P, Commission v. BASF and Others, 
para. 49; and Case C-245/92 P, Chemie Linz v. Commission, para. 94.;
22 C. Bjerregaard Eskildsen, “VAT Grouping versus Freedom of Establishment”, EC Tax Rev. 2011-3, p.116;
paper but it is important to discuss its implications before we introduce further issues related to 
implementation of the ECJ judgement in FCE Bank.
The European Commission argues that art.11 modifies the relationship  between a VAT group and 
foreign FEs of constituent members of the group23. A group  becomes a separate, special person 
whose transactions with foreign FEs become taxable transactions upon the registration of the group. 
Whether or not such a reading of the expression “single taxable person” in art.11 is legitimate and 
whether a VAT group is a special “person” for VAT purposes will be dealt with in section 4 of this 
paper but for now, let’s consider the consequences of such proposition. 
If the registration of a VAT group changes the relationship between the constituent members of the 
group and their foreign establishments it is clear that foreign FEs cannot belong to a domestic group 
(graph 1). It is however doubtful that the same holds water when a foreign FE joins a foreign group 
(graph 2). In the latter scenario the group would dissociate a FE from its head office which would 
‘lose’ all its life juices from a head office which defines its activities and manages it. After all, a FE 
is a concept  which only  came to existence to recognise or acknowledge the presence of a foreign 
taxable person on the territory of another MS24  even thought that a FE must display a sufficient 
degree of independence to use services for its own needs25. A FE would therefore morph into a shell 
with no content or become an effective subsidiary  by managing itself. Just as much as the situation 
in which a foreign FE is left to its own devices by  the head office joining a VAT group can be 
equated to a child fleeing home upon maturation the situation in which a foreign FE joins a foreign 
VAT group therefore being cut off from its management can be equated to a kidnapping of a child. 
The former is acceptable and even expected, the latter is undesirable. Some MS, namely the 
Netherlands 26 and Czech Republic27, have made arrangements in which they include a foreign head 
office in a domestic group structure when a domestic FE joins a VAT group. This arrangement 
might be linked with the fact that the Netherlands accepts the judgement in FCE Bank in full. 
However, common sense requires that VAT groups include a head office when a FE joins a group. 
The consequences of Commission’s argument that a group is a new taxable person which modifies 
the relationship between group members and their FEs abroad has the consequence of meddling 
with companies corporate structure in a non-neutral way which produces doubts over who is this 
new person formed of. It is therefore of pivotal importance to settle the question whether art.11 
gives rise to a special scheme or a special person and if it does, in what way does this new scheme 
or person shape the relationship between a group and other actors.  
11
23 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the VAT group option provided 
for in Article 11 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax Brussels, 2.7.2009 COM
(2009) 325 final, p.8;
24 H. van Arendouk, S. Jansen, R. van der Paardt (eds.), VAT in an EU and International Perspective: Essays in honour 
of Han Kogels, Amsterdam/Hornbaek: IBFD, p. 37;
25 Art.11 of the IR;
26 Dutch Supreme Court, 12 June 2002, case No. 35976 (IVM 6 (2002), p. 538;
27 L. Bijl et al. “EU VAT Grouping Provisions: Update”, Issue 5, August 2012, p.34;
Picture 1: Head office joins the VAT group - the relationship between the head office and foreign FE 
severed
Picture 2: Foreign FE joins the VAT group - the relationship between head office and foreign FE 
severed
Some countries (UK, Netherlands) have fully embraced the judgement in FCE Bank and applied it 
to VAT groups. Although such MS certainly belong to minority the fact that Unionwide groups can 
be formed is a fact. As previously  stated varying interpretation of FCE Bank  distorts the internal 
market and causes tax competition. However, full application of FCE Bank can also lead to cases of 
double non-taxation, double taxation, potential abuse and problems with deduction.
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Double non-taxation
When MS1 exercises VAT group  option and fully applies FCE Bank while MS2 refrained from 
adopting VAT groups non-taxation might occur if a group  is formed in MS1 and services are 
provided from MS2 to MS1. This situation has been illustrated on picture 3. In this situation28, 
transactions between the group  in MS1and FE in MS2 would be outside the scope of VAT from 
MS1’s perspective whilst a deduction would be possible in MS229. Alternatively, cross-border VAT 
groups might lead to double taxation30. This remains a problem until MS decide to introduce 
internal taxation (deemed supply rule).
Picture 3: An example of non-taxation resulting from full implementation of the judgement in FCE 
Bank
Abuse
Moreover, implementation of FCE Bank  opens up a possibility  to structure one’s business to avoid 
or abuse tax. Vyncke furnishes multiple examples as to how this might happen31. One of the 
scenarios involves a creation of a Unionwide VAT group which can for example benefit by setting 
up an FE and acquiring services from a country with a higher rate of deduction and channelling 
13
28 In this situation we assume the following: 1) services supplied between MS1 and MS2 are supplied at the place where 
customer is established, i.e. in MS1, 2) services are subject to reverse charge mechanism, 3) the services are not exempt. 
29 This example is taken from: R. Zuidgeest, “Cross-Border VAT Grouping”, International VAT Monitor, January/
February 2010, p.26;
30 A. van Doesum et al. “Internal Market and VAT: Intra-group Transactions of Branches, Subsidiaries and VAT 
Groups”, EC Tax. Rev. 2007/1, p.39;
31 K. Vyncke, “VAT Grouping in the European Union: Purposes and Limitations”, International VAT Monitor, July/
August 2007, p.258;
them to a country with a lower rate of deduction32. This strategy would be a successful and 
legitimate tax minimizing strategy for taxpayers providing e.g. banking services. It is however also 
possible to structure one’s business so that it contains a head office which purchases VAT-free 
supplies outside the EU and streamlines them to an EU based FE. Some countries, like Belgium do 
not tax services rendered by a head office or a FE established outside the EU to its EU FE or head 
office33 . Such a scheme is currently  being challenged in the ECJ in the Skandia America 
Corporation34 case. It  is unlikely that the Court will decide upon the question whether or not this 
use of Union law is abusive because the issue was not raised to the Court  so it  remains a mystery 
whether such use of FCE Bank in VAT group  context is abusive or not. It however proves the point 
that liberal implementation of FCE Bank might to used to borderline or outright abusive ends.
Problems with deduction
Extension of VAT groups to include foreign FEs can result  in problems with deduction of input 
VAT. It is due to differences in the kinds of activities MS decided to exempt, different methods used 
to attribute input VAT to taxable and exempt supplies, problems with mutual recognition of 
deduction caused by insufficient understanding of deduction system in another MS, lack of 
common definitions regarding for example capital supplies etc35. 
It remains to be seen whether the Commission will take steps to universalise the interpretation of 
FCE Bank and case’s impact on VAT groups. In the past Commission has exerted political pressure 
on Germany to adopt its policy  to align it with Commission’s interpretation36 so it is likely that 
Commission will at  least attempt to harmonize this area. The process will be facilitated  because in 
light of the Directive (confirmed in the Ampliscientifica37 judgement) it is mandatory to consult the 
VAT Committee prior to the adoption of VAT group regulations and any substantive modifications 
thereto. As a consequence the process yields itself to scrutiny from and subsequent influence of the 
Union bodies on MS decision-making which results in approximation of laws. However, to 
universalise FCE Bank would mean to first understand the relationship between groups and their 
members and then, to consider the consequences of pan-EU VAT groups.   
3.3. Voluntary nature
Art.11 is facultative and some MS have not exercised the option to permit group registration. Those 
that have had either instituted compulsory  or voluntary registration process. The dissonance in 
implementation has both fiscal and constitutional consequences for MS. As previously mentioned, 
VAT group regime has been treated by the MS as a tool of harmful tax competition (see page 10). 
This flows exactly from regime’s voluntary nature coupled with the requirement that VAT groups 
14
32 R. Zuidgeest, “Cross-Border VAT Grouping”, International VAT Monitor, January/February 2010, p.29;
33CFE Opinion on the Consequences of the ECJ Interpretation of the VAT Treatment of Transactions Between Head 
Offices and Branches (C-210/04, FCE Bank). Paper submitted by the Confederation Fiscale Europeenne to the 
European Institutions in 2008, European Taxation, January 2009, p.33;
34 C-7/13;
35 CFE Opinion on the Consequences of the ECJ Interpretation of the VAT Treatment of Transactions Between Head 
Offices and Branches (C-210/04, FCE Bank). Paper submitted by the Confederation Fiscale Europeenne to the 
European Institutions in 2008, European Taxation, January 2009, p.33;
36 I. Massin and K. Vyncke, “EC Communication on VAT Grouping: An Attempt to Harmonize or to Restrict the Use of 
Group Registration?”, International VAT Monitor, November/December 2009, p.460;
37 C-162/07 Ampliscientifica;
must be confined to a single taxable jurisdiction. The distortion occurs at two levels, national and 
international. The distortion occurs at the national level when an opt-in system is in place and 
creates advantages to those who register. This distortion does not exist where the national system 
requires compulsory  registration which treats all taxpayers equally. It is however problematic when 
both systems exist in the EU. This creates distortions on the international level. 
In addition, the Commission has observed that  “by design, many grouping schemes do not ensure 
that effects are limited to the national territory of the Member State concerned, which, according to 
the Commission, can run counter to the principle of tax neutrality and may be a source of tax 
competition between the Member States”38. Rzepa and Wyganowski concur and argue that Poland 
is an example of a country where a VAT grouping provision is absent, yet, the taxpayers can benefit 
from its spill over effects39. When one MS transposes an optional article and it has a direct spill-
over effect in other MSs, especially those who actively reject the facultative provision we are faced 
with an infringement of sovereignty. Sovereignty on the other hand has been used by the 
Commission as an argument to justify  the territorial restriction in art.11 and debunk FCE Bank. It 
argues that a voluntary  mode requires a territorial restriction to respect national sovereignty of those 
MS who reject the idea of VAT groups40. It is clear that  the measures employed to prevent 
infringements of sovereignty (territoriality criterium) do not match the expected outcomes.
The lack of neutrality  and infringements of national sovereignty expose the deficits in the design of 
art.11 both on the level of insufficiently clear wording which leaves room for MS to introduce 
compulsory  or voluntary group registration regime and on the level of insufficiently effective 
measures to address the spill-over effects of art.11 on the MS which refused to adopt the provision.
3.4. Sectoral approach
Sweden and Finland have restricted VAT group registration to companies operating in financial and 
insurance sectors. This sectoral approach is motivated by  the attempt to give relief persons who 
suffer from the burden of non-deductable VAT and prevent tax avoidance. In the recent case, 
Commission v Sweden41, despite an AG Jaaskinen’s opinion to the contrary42, the ECJ has upheld 
the limitation on the ground that Commission failed to show that limiting the scope of art.11 is a 
measure ill-founded to prevent abuse43. It is though important to observe that the ECJ in principle 
condemned sectoral approach.
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Sectoral approach is problematic because it might constitute forbidden state aid under art.107 TFEU 
and because it stands in direct opposition to the literal meaning of the art.11. Such approach results 
in distortion of neutrality of competition because it privileges exempt persons.
3.5. Connectivity
According to art.11 in order to create a VAT group “any  persons” need o demonstrate that they are 
connected by economic, financial and organisational ties. The article does not elaborate on the 
meaning of the three so it comes as no surprice that MS have developed divergent strategies to 
assess what constitutes the aforementioned ties. The Commission has however developed a 
framework and spelled out a set of directions to fulfill the economic test from art.11:
- the financial links refer to a percentage participation in the capital or voting rights which must 
amount to 50% or over;
- the economic link is defined in terms of close cooperation which exists when, for example, the 
economic activities of members of the group are the same in nature, complementary or 
interdependent or when one member of the group carried out activities partially or wholly  for the 
benefit of the other members;
- the organisational link refers to the shared management structure44.
All the criteria must be fulfilled simultaneously for the entire time the group exists; when a member 
of the group ceases to fulfill any of them at any given time he must leave the group. Here, 
connectivity becomes tricky. Firstly, the criteria so laid out do not enable to create groups where the 
circumstances render one of the criteria absent or hardly existent. Zuuidgeest argues that it should 
be possible to group companies according to the primary or main connective factor, that is, weak 
links in one respect can compensate for other links45. This could redress the inherent  flaw of current 
criteria which is the assumption that real control is exercised through the exercise of voting rights or 
on the basis of shareholding. It would however further deepen another, already mentioned, problem 
with connective criteria -- the lack of legal certainty  associated with dissonance between national 
tests. Further relativisation of the economic link test disturbs fiscal neutrality  because it enables the 
taxpayers on one side of the border to form a group which taxpayers in the same circumstances over 
the other side cannot form. Uniformisation of the criteria is especially pivotal in those MS which 
introduced a mandatory system since taxpayers must be able to organize their affairs in accordance 
with law. Hence, even though current guidelines do not fully capture all the cases in which groups 
might exist (cases in which real control exists but is not captured by the three criteria) they at least 
provide some legal certainty and minimise the discretion afforded by the wording of art.11. 
Secondly, links can only be established directly and cannot be established via companies not 
involved in a group, for example foreign subsidiaries or foreign FEs of group  members46. The 
economic link test in this respect is inflexible and does not  allow to truly realise the ‘substance over 
form’ maxim because companies which would have been considered connected in a domestic 
setting lose that connection when foreign actors are involved. Existence of the group is therefore, at 
16
44 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the VAT group option provided 
for in Article 11 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax Brussels, 2.7.2009 COM
(2009) 325 final, p. 9; 
45 R. Zuidgeest, “Cross-Border VAT Grouping”, International VAT Monitor, January/February 2010, p.30;
46 Ibid. p.30;
least theoretically, conditional upon the legal structure of the enterprises and the length of the chain 
they form. 
To conclude, art.11 suffers from a vagueness of the condition that “any persons” must be bound by 
financial, economic and organisational links. This gave grist  for the mills for the MS which 
developed their independent, yet similar, tests which undermine uniformity of interpretation of art.
11 and legal certainty, so much desired especially in those MS which introduced mandatory group 
registration. The economic test  developed by  the Commission is however far from perfect as it does 
not allow to fully  capture the control or influence which companies might have on one another. It 
furthermore, neglects the possibility  that companies might be indirectly connected and fosters the 
idea that groups can be only formed by directly connected actors.
4. The Meaning and Scope of a ‘Person’ in VAT Group Context
It is well settled case law that in determining the scope of a provision or to determine the meaning 
of the words of EU law it  is necessary to take into account the wording, context and objectives of 
the provision47. Moreover, it is important to compare different equally authentic language versions 
of same same provision48 paying equal attention to all of them regardless of the number of people 
speaking the language49. The author will now look at literal, contextual, historic and purposive 
interpretation of the words “any  persons” in art.11 and then investigate the meaning and scope of 
‘person’ in ECJ case law to determine the preferred meaning of the expression in the VAT law.
4.1. Literal interpretation
Art.11 reads:
“[...] each Member State may  regard as a single taxable person any persons established in the 
territory of that Member State who, while legally independent, are closely  bound to one another by 
financial, economic and organisational links.”
The wording of the provision uses the expression ‘any  persons’ to describe actors eligible to join a 
VAT group. Those words have been to a large extent adopted uniformly across different language 
versions of the VAT Directive50 and have a qualitative and quantitative bearing on the composition, 
size and expanse of actors involved in groups.  
The words ‘any persons’ entail broad participation in VAT groups. ‘Any’ means unlimited, 
unrestricted, unqualified, unconditional, whichever. The wording imposes no further qualitative 
conditions that persons who wish to participate in a group need to fulfill any additional criterium 
other than being a mere person for VAT purposes. It does not  explicitly  require that persons are 
taxable, it makes no distinction between taxable and non-taxable persons. Different language 
versions of art.11 RVD do not require that persons are taxable; no language version uses ‘taxable 
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persons’ instead of ‘persons’ to describe the prerequisite for group registration. To the contrary, 
there is one language version, Romanian which uses the words “orine persoane” which translates 
into “every  person” and shows that the definition of a “person” was to be as wide as possible. 
Moreover, the wording does not look at the status of the taxpayer, does not consider the right  to 
deduct. ‘Any persons‘ are also not confined to a sector, persons might come from all industries. 
Furthermore, the words ‘any persons’ imply that a person who belongs to one VAT group is free to 
join another VAT group provided the territorial restriction is respected and connective factors 
between persons found. Further wording of the provision does nothing to qualify this possibility. 
Literal interpretation of ‘any  persons’ leads to conclude that  VAT group can be registered when 
persons are taxable or non-taxable, with a full or partial right to deduct, come from one sector or 
another and belong to one or multiple groups.
‘Any’ in the expression ‘any persons’ does not impact the size of the group. Even though ‘any’ 
could be interpreted to the effect that taxpayers can admit unlimited number of actors into the group 
-- any many persons -- the word ‘any’ does not have a quantitative dimension. ‘Any’ describes the 
quality of taxpayers. It is however a valid concern that the provision does not  specify  the maximum 
size of the group and leaves it open to MS to determine the issue. Laissez faire approach to the issue 
of size of groups combined with other factors such as mandatory registration results in registration 
of groups which are too big to handle which vitiates the objective of VAT groups which is widely 
understood simplification.
However, apart from the wording due regard should be paid to grammatical context when 
interpreting the meaning of any  provision of EU law. Looking at the grammatical context requires 
inquiring into how the interpreted word fits into the structure of the provision. In art.11 the word 
‘person’ appears twice, once to describe the prerequisite for group formation (‘any persons’) and 
once to describe the consequence of group registration (‘single taxable person’). Despite the fact 
that the expression ‘single taxable person’ appears prior to ‘any persons’ it does not mean that the 
legislator intended to import the word ‘taxable’ from ‘single taxable person’ into ‘any  persons’. Had 
the legislator wished members of the group  to be taxable persons he would have stated so explicitly. 
The fact that ‘any persons’ can form a ‘single taxable person’ does not imply  that they  must be 
taxable persons to form a ‘single taxable person’. The conclusion might have been different had the 
legislator failed to put the word ‘any’ before ‘persons’. Then, the characteristics of a person would 
have been in doubt given the lack of proper grammatical treatment. However, currently, despite its 
wide characteristics, a ‘person’ is sufficiently well defined for the purposes of art.11.
The omission to put the word ‘taxable’ in the expression ‘any  persons’ cannot be motivated by the 
intention to avoid repetition either as the Commission argued in Commission vs. Ireland51. Contrary 
conclusion is appropriate. When the EU legislator uses the word ‘persons’ instead of ‘taxable 
persons’ to avoid repetition this happens outside Title III. Moreover, it  is clear from the reading of 
Title III that  when the EU legislator wants to include a ‘person’ in the scope of ‘taxable persons’ he 
does so explicitly. Such a stylistic intervention is visible in art.9(2) where ‘persons’ who carry out 
activities on occasional basis shall be regarded as taxable persons. The fact that the words ‘taxable 
person’ appears earlier in the text is caused by the grammatical construction, not by the intention to 
carry the word ‘taxable’ over, nor by the desire to avoid repetition. 
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4.2. Contextual interpretation
4.2.1. Immediate context
Art.11 can be found in Title III RVD (‘Taxable persons’) which contains general and specific 
provisions regarding taxable persons in art.9-13. Art.9 is a general provision defining the concept of 
a taxable person while the subsequent provisions in Title III expand on this definition by  including 
(work on occasional basis) or excluding (public authorities) categories of persons from the 
definition of a taxable person. Art.11 ought to be understood mainly in the context of Title III but 
regard should be also had to any provisions in the VAT Directive that help  to navigate the meaning 
of the provision in question.
Art.11 uses terms defined in art.9 and builds on it. However, this is not to say  that to be eligible to 
benefit from perks of art.11 a taxpayer must fulfill the criteria laid down in art.9. It also does not 
mean that to use art.11 one must be specifically  excluded from the scope of art.9. The two articles 
are distinct and neither of the articles makes explicit references to the other. This would mean that 
the expression “any persons” is a self-standing expression, making no references to art.9. That is, 
“any  persons” do not have to be taxable persons because art.9 pertains to taxable persons. The fact 
that art.9 defines taxable persons does not mean that subsequent provisions use ‘taxable persons’ 
unless otherwise proscribed. In fact Terra and Kajus make an argument that the construction of art.9 
points to the conclusion that unless a “person” is caught within the net of art.9 i.e. is any person 
who independently carries out in any place any economic activity whatever the purpose or result of 
that activity, it remains a non-taxable person52.  However, it could be argued that  art.9 and art.11 
read in conjunction form a logical whole and that interpretation of art.11 should not affect 
interpretation of art.9 which could occur if “any persons” was not interpreted as “taxable 
persons”53. This could potentially  undermine art.9. Nevertheless, it is important to note that  art.9 is 
not lex superior to art.11 which means that when art.9 does not take priority  when in conflict with 
art.11. Those two articles form a logical whole within the Title by building on and not 
complementing each other.The same can be said about the relationship between art.9 and any other 
article in Title III. Therefore, art.11 does not undermine art.9. 
If art.9 was unable to help us further refine the meaning of “any persons” in art.11 the same holds 
for the expression “persons established in the territory of the MS”. Art.9 does not use the concept of 
establishment to define a taxable person which would be helpful to explain what it means to be 
established for a “person” in the meaning of art.11. However, a less immediate context can shed 
some light on the issue. Art.44 and the place of supply rules inform us about what a “person” is 
composed of. The article acknowledges that a “person” can have multiple establishments, both 
primary and secondary, which nevertheless constitute one person and which facilitate determination 
of place of supply  of services. Art.44 stretches geographically all “persons” in Title III, also “any 
persons established in the territory of the MS”. If a “person” is established in a MS it means that its 
primary establishment is situated there. All the secondary establishments may be registered abroad 
and perform a function for the place of supply purposes but they are intrinsically linked with the 
primary establishment. The “person” in the VAT directive transcends boundaries, a “person” is not 
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defined by its scope and establishment denotes a function rather than geographical affiliation for 
VAT purposes.
The reading of art.11 in light of its context in the directive tells us something about the concept  of a 
“person”. A “person” is not geographically  limited, the fact that it is functionally  divided does not 
change this conclusion. The expression “any  persons” should not be understood as “taxable 
persons”. In fact, the literal meaning of the expression remains unaffected by other provisions in 
Title III because they are not immediately linked but merely grouped by the theme. Art.9 sets the 
tone for the subsequent provisions but does not impact the way that “any  persons” should be 
interpreted for the purposes of art.11. 
4.2.2. The VAT grouping option in the broader VAT regime context - neutrality
According to the principle of conferral secondary EU legislation must stand in conformity  with the 
primary Union legislation. Union bodies can legislate only within the remit of the competences 
conferred on them by the treaties and respect the common values, principles and objectives 
encapsulated therein54. The ECJ which investigated the relationship between primary  Union law 
and VAT in the Schmelz55 case affirmed that the system of VAT must be compatible with Treaties, 
especially with the fundamental Treaty  freedoms. Hence, the system of VAT must respect the 
fundamental freedoms, the principle of equal treatment, the principle of non-discrimination. It  is 
settled case law that the principle of equal treatment are reflected in the principle of fiscal 
neutrality56.
Interpretation of terminology should be guided by the legal character of the tax57 . VAT is a general 
tax on consumption expenditure, levied on all stages of production. The principle of neutrality is 
reflected in VAT’s generality  and deduction system structure58. VAT achieves neutrality of legal 
form and neutrality  of competition where VAT is imposed on all economic activities regardless of 
their purpose or end result and ensures that all economic operators, regardless of their legal form or 
structure have an equal competitive position. The deduction system on the other hand allows 
taxable persons to fully and immediately deduct input VAT against output VAT regardless of the 
number of the production stages involved in the process. It is neutral in respect to transactions, 
whatever their legal form might be59.
From a system design perspective interpretation of concepts in the VAT Directive must reflect the 
principle of fiscal neutrality. In the context of VAT groups ‘neutral interpretation’ has been already 
achieved in the Commission v Ireland case where the ECJ held that “any persons”  in art.11 should 
be interpreted literally and hence, non-taxable persons should be allowed to join VAT groups. To 
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allow only taxable persons to form VAT groups would be to distort neutrality of legal form. 
Similarly, neutrality of competition is distorted when only some legal persons can benefit from 
group registration which seems to preclude any sectoral limitations or voluntariness of the group 
registration. It is only neutral that taxpayers which are in similar situations are treated in the same 
way. Therefore, limiting VAT groups to a certain sector, for example to a sector which carries 
exempt activities, would put at a disadvantage those sectors which also carry out exempt activities 
but cannot form a group to minimise their compliance burden. Likewise, when a MS treats group 
registration in an opt-in fashion it encourages registration of those businesses which will benefit 
from it. This undermines neutrality of legal form and distorts neutrality on an international scale 
where businesses with similar activities and structures get taxed differently depending on whether 
the MS of their establishment decided to first, adopt the grouping option and second, fully tax or 
exempt the activities in which the business is involved. It is therefore preferred that when VAT 
grouping option is exercised that such option is extended to all sectors of economic activity and that 
all connected persons are obliged to register regardless of whether they will benefit from it or not. 
It is also pertinent that VAT rules are framed so that they do not influence business decisions 
regarding cross-border expansion of the business or the decision whether to outsource some 
activities or not60. Therefore, ‘persons’ for the purposes of art.11 should be considered holistically 
and include all the foreign FEs in accordance with the judgement in FCE Bank. VAT grouping 
should not affect companies’ decision whether to carry out cross-border activity and hence, a 
‘neutral interpretation’ takes “any persons” to mean “any persons primarily established...”. 
Interpretation in the broader VAT regime context, especially from the perspective of the principle of 
neutrality, favours broad interpretation of the terms “any persons”. Businesses in similar situations 
should be treated the same way and VAT ought not influence the decision as to how to structure 
one’s business. Legal character of VAT requires that all economic operators are put on an equal 
footing and given equal opportunities. ‘Persons’ therefore mean ‘persons of all businesses’, ‘all 
persons’ and ‘persons in their totality’. 
4.3. Historic interpretation
Legislative intent behind the words “any persons” can be found by tracing historical changes in the 
wording of what is currently art.11 from the moment the concept of VAT grouping creeped into the 
legislation. The article derives from art.4 of the Sixth Directive which on the other hand derives 
from the Second Directive. The phrasing of the Second Directive used the words “separate taxable 
persons” to describe potential candidates for group registration. The wording has been however 
abandoned as the Sixth Directive came into place and the word “any” has substituted “separate 
taxable” in the English language version61. This semantic change goes beyond a stylistic change. 
The legislator deliberately  dropped the words “separate” and “taxable” and inserted “any” instead. 
The words “any  persons” gained a final stamp of approval when they  were carried onto the current 
Recast Directive. The successive adding and subtracting as well as the preservation of the wording 
when a change was possible indicate an active choice on the part of the EU legislator who intended 
to widen the scope and open group registration to a wide range of actors.
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4.4. Purposive interpretation - Objectives of art.11
The objectives of VAT grouping regulation can be found in the early  documents which pre-date the 
actual introduction of VAT groups and in contemporary  Union policy papers. Despite earlier 
appearances probably the most detailed and authoritative layout appears in the Explanatory 
Memorandum62  to the proposal which resulted in the adoption of the Sixth Directive (COM(73) 
950) which holds that the purpose behind art.4 (now art.11) was to prevent companies which are 
organically  connected to abuse the special enterprice scheme, to simplify administration and to 
realise the ‘substance over form’ rule in which technically separate, yet practically associated 
companies are seen as one in the eyes of the law. In spite the fact that VAT groups have outlived its 
purpose, i.e. the objectives have been fulfilled by  other means for example by the introduction of 
the small enterprices scheme, it is important to ponder about groups in light of their initial context. 
Therefore, the author will first address the issue of whether VAT groups have been intended as a 
special scheme or a special person and then consider the wording of art.11 in light  of its purpose 
and mischief.
4.4.1. VAT grouping as a special scheme/person
At the first glance it is visible that the Explanatory Memorandum does not  mention that VAT groups 
were intended as a special scheme but as a simplification device. By reflecting economic reality 
VAT groups were intended to limit avoidance and give primacy to the substance of the arrangement, 
not the form. The Memo does not  state explicitly that VAT groups were intended to be a special 
scheme.
The special scheme idea is also not supported when we analyze the directive itself. Firstly, the VAT 
group provision is found in Title III and not in Title XII which is devoted specifically to special 
schemes. All the six special schemes are kept together in the directive, presumably to exclude the 
possibility that any other provision not included in Title XII is to be taken for a special scheme. 
Moreover, it is in the nature of the special scheme that it contains more than one provision to 
regulate it, e.g. the special scheme for travel agents contains 5 articles whilst a scheme for 
investment gold contains 13. VAT groups are regulated by  a single provision, not found in Title XII. 
In addition, the grouping provision is not a special scheme because contrary to special schemes it is 
not aimed at selected groups of taxpayers but has a general character. Neither the preparatory 
documents, nor the construction and logic of the directive evidence that VAT group option was 
intended as a scheme within the meaning of the VAT Directive. Even though the option has a 
facultative nature and constitutes a derogation just like special schemes do it does not subsume it 
under the special scheme section. Moreover, taxation or interpretation by analogy is not permitted63. 
The interpretative consequences of treating VAT groups as special schemes or just mere derogations 
might be the same given the fact that special schemes, exemptions and derogations must be 
interpreted equally restrictively64 but it is safe to conclude that VAT groups were not intended as a 
special scheme for the abovementioned reasons.
22
62 Proposal of 14 April 1965 for a Second Directive for the harmonization among Member States of turnover tax 
legislation, concerning the form and the methods of application of the common system of taxation on value added. 
63 O. Henkow, “Neutrality of VAT for taxable persons: a new approach in European VAT?”, EC Tax Review 2008/5, p.
240;
64 For example: C-8/01 Taksatorringen, para. 36; C-472/03 Arthur Andersen, para. 24;
It is however conceivable that a VAT group is a special person. Yet, ECJ in the Polysar65 case held 
that any collection of companies is not a group; VAT group is a structure not purely  inferred from 
facts but something which has to be registered. As mentioned before, this view is maintained by the 
Commission who uses it to motivate various of its policies which if adopted, could lead to absurd 
results. To convincingly justify the position that  group  registration modifies the relationship 
between constituent members of the group  and their foreign FEs without doing so with the domestic 
FEs a VAT group would have to indeed posses special qualities, far beyond the mere fact a VAT 
group is a new taxable person66. In Commission’s view point registration of a new taxable person is 
synonymous with a creation of a special taxable person. Interestingly enough, the Commission does 
not maintain the same stance with relation to registration of other new taxpayers other than groups 
and to registration of groups with exclusively domestic branches. 
It is difficult to see why registration of a new taxpayer, even if previously  registered at a different 
number, would give rise any special properties. VAT Directive does not provide that a change in 
registration number results in special rights or additional obligations to the taxpayer. If a special 
person in the form of a VAT group exists then its power to dissolve links between head offices and 
branches should be based on a criterium other than novelty. Moreover, the purpose of art.11 is to 
bring together, not separate companies. A group  which cuts off, separates foreign FEs from the rest 
of the group certainly does not fulfill the grouping purpose. Finally, if art.11 indeed gives rise to a 
special taxable person the special rights and obligations of such a person would be outlined in detail 
in the directive itself. All the special taxable persons, like Societas Europaea or Societas Privat 
Europaea, have their precise and definite legal basis (although not in the VAT Directive)67. The 
Directive would have stated clearly  that art.11 is not subject to standard VAT rules and the ECJ, 
aware of such a special person, would have made an exception to FCE Bank  in the judgement itself 
by excluding VAT groups from its scope (ECJ was not  officially asked a question to that effect but 
had nevertheless a possibility to exclude groups from its scope). However, the judgement does not 
do so. Hence, both the legislator and the ECJ would have made reservations in the Directive and in 
case law had the art.11 indeed created a special person capable of changing relationship between 
groups and their organs. Therefore, neither a “single taxable person”, nor a VAT group are special 
persons in the VAT Directive and hence, follow standard VAT rules and ECJ jurisdiction.
4.4.2. The meaning of “any persons” in light of the purpose of art.11
VAT grouping was designed with a purpose to simplify  compliance and administration and prevent 
tax abuse. However, contrary to other VAT arrangements in the World, like the Australian68, 
European VAT grouping’s objective goes beyond administrative convenience and endeavors to give 
primacy to substance over legal form. 
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The objective to simplify  administration encourages restrictive interpretation of art.11 because 
administration becomes easier when few homogenous companies are grouped together. Expansive, 
broad reading of “any persons” means that all kinds of persons are included in a group which poses 
challenges to tax authority to supervise and manage heterogenous groups, especially  in terms of 
ensuring proper deduction. Moreover, the ability  to create cross-border groups puts pressure onto 
national tax authorities to get accustomed with foreign exemptions and deduction procedures to 
ensure proper deduction and prevent tax avoidance. Therefore, it  can be argued that literal 
interpretation does not deliver results intended by the designer of the provisions; literal 
interpretation vitiates the purpose behind the wording. 
However, if the ‘substance over form’ maxim is taken as an anchor point purposive interpretation 
becomes more in line with literal interpretation because of the appreciation for the fact that broad 
reading of “any persons” allows for the highest level of flexibility. Flexibility in interpretation on 
the other hand, accommodates the variety of legal arrangements which can be entered by the 
companies and see through them to the effect  that groups can be formed by companies in different 
degrees of separation from each other. In other words, ‘substance over form’ manifests itself where 
interpretation captures the reality  of legal situation and disregards the legal form in order to create a 
group. Therefore, “any persons” has a function to embrace, gather those persons in the group which 
are linked to each other. Putting it  in the context of the whole provision art.11 - “any persons” do 
not have to be immediately connected to each other to form a group because the purpose behind the 
provision is to see through the legal arrangement and group companies which are connected 
regardless of what is the legal form in which the taxpayers decided to organise their affairs. 
Therefore, purposive interpretation would see “any persons” not as “any immediately connected 
persons” but simply (and in line with the literal interpretation) as “any persons”. 
Moreover, as mentioned in section 4.4.1 the purpose behind art.11 is to bring companies together. 
The bringing together should therefore also disregard the degrees of separation between companies 
and enable the creation of groups even where the connection can be found via an intervening 
company (such as a foreign or domestic FE or a domestic holding company). Intervening 
companies should not break the chain between organically connected yet technically separate 
companies and therefore, should play a role in finding a connection for the purposes of creating the 
group. However, both the objective to group companies and the ambition to give precedence to 
substance over form do not presuppose the introduction of mandatory registration of VAT groups. It 
is true however that those aims would be realised better, and further underpin the principle of fiscal 
neutrality, if VAT grouping was mandatory in countries where the grouping option is exercised. It is 
because the concept of grouping disregards the possible advantages or disadvantages of group 
registration. Companies are grouped with a view to capture real structure of the company as 
opposed to an organizational order shaped by the legal regulations and not to maximise their 
competitive advantage. However, in light of the purposes behind art.11 we are unable to determine 
that VAT groups should be obligatory. It  is sufficient to enable companies to group together for 
VAT purposes to fulfill the purpose. 
To summarise, purposive interpretation of “any persons” warrants broad interpretation of the 
expression which has implication for how the provision should be read as a whole. In light of the 
above “any  persons” should not be understood as “any immediately connected persons” but “any 
connected persons”. However, it is sufficient that  the ‘persons’ can be grouped together to fulfill the 
purpose of the provision, they do not have to be grouped together to realise the ‘substance over 
form maxim’.  
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4.5. Interpretation in light of case law
The ECJ has on many occasions interpreted the concept of a ‘person’ for VAT purposes. We will 
now investigate in chronological order the most notable cases, Heerma69, HE70 , FCE Bank and 
Commission v Ireland, to identify the properties of a “any persons” which derive from ECJ 
jurisprudence. 
Heerma concerned a married couple who also formed a partnership for business purposes. Mr 
Heerma letted tangible property  to the partnership. The ECJ considered whether he was acting 
independently or on behalf of a taxable person (the partnership) and remarked that a partnership 
which is a single taxable person has a de facto independence of a company 71  different from 
individual economic autonomy of the partners to the membership who can, despite being jointly 
liable in the partnership, carry out economic activities independently. This judgement applied in the 
context of VAT groups leads to conclude that even though group members form a single taxable 
person they are not stripped from their ability to have individual economic activities and despite 
being bound by the group  their individual structures remain intact when a group is registered. The 
partnership or a group is an add-on to the individual structures. This discredits Commission’s claims 
that VAT group registration changes group’s relationship with foreign FEs of constituent members 
of the group. A group, which is a new taxable person, has a de facto independence but it  has no 
power to change the relationships within a group. 
HE also concerned a spouse pursuing an economic activity. This time the ECJ held similarly, that 
the principle of neutrality requires that spouses who despite the lack of legal personality carry out 
economic activity  and individually participate as recipients in the transaction in question can deduct 
input VAT when supplies are made for business purposes. In this case “any persons” (for the 
purposes of defining a taxable person) was interpreted as persons with legal personality or 
independent persons which is why relationship HE did not constitute a taxable person. It is 
important to observe that ECJ reiterates its reasoning from Heerma and focuses on neutrality of 
legal form when considering deduction. 
Independence was again an important  element in another judgement: FCE Bank. The ECJ held that 
a branch which does not  have its own endowment capital, does not bear its own risks and which is 
dependent from the head office is not a separate taxable person from the head office. A single 
taxable person is hence characterised by the relationship of dependency. It also means that a taxable 
person might transcend borders and be a cross-border entity. It  it remarkable that the ECJ has not 
limited the scope of the judgement to taxable persons which do not form groups and therefore this 
judgement applies to provisions across the directive. It follows then, that the concept  of 
‘establishment’ in art.11 should be influenced by  the concept of a ‘person’ from FCE Bank, i.e. that 
to be established within the meaning of art.11 is to have a primary  establishment in the country 
where the grouping option is exercised.  
The recent development in Commission v Ireland unlike previous case law provides us with a 
concrete formulae for who is covered by the notion of a “any persons” in art.11. The Court held that 
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the expression is broad and includes taxable, non-taxable and exempt persons. This interpretation is 
in line with the principle of neutrality because it does affect the taxpayers choice of legal form.  
According to ECJ a ‘person’ for the purposes of Title III of the Directive is an independent entity 
which might or might not have a legal personality (Heerma, HE). A ‘single taxable person’ can 
transcend borders (FCE Bank). Moreover, the registration of a new ‘single taxable person’ does not 
affect the structure and characteristics of the constituent members of the new person which they had 
before the new person was registered, e.g. a partner to the partnership is not precluded from making 
individual supplies to the partnership  despite his participation in the partnership (Heerma). “Any 
persons” can be taxable, non-taxable or exempt as the concept is broad and reflects the principle of 
neutrality. 
4.6. Tentative conclusions
It is clear from the literal reading of art.11, its legislative history, context and purpose that  the 
expression “any persons” should be understood widely. The ‘person’ in art.11 can be therefore 
taxable, exempt or non-taxable, act in any economic sector, operate cross-border or on a purely 
domestic scale. A VAT group is however not a special taxable person and its properties do not 
extend beyond those of a ‘person’ in the meaning of the VAT Directive, i.e. VAT group  does not 
change the relationship between the constituent members of the group and foreign FE of those 
members. Case law indicates that a ‘person’ should be an independent entity but it  is not the legal 
form which is decisive.  
Moreover, even though the expression has a qualitative and not quantitative character the purpose 
behind the wording might have a bearing on the issue of connectivity between group members. 
“Any persons” does not mean that  ‘persons’ ought to be immediately connected to each other and 
hence allows that  a group is formed of ‘persons’ who are separated by different degrees of 
separation. The expression however does not inform us about  the size of the group because it  does 
not have quantitative character. 
5. Preferred Treatment
According to settled ECJ case law, the dispositions of the VAT Directive must be interpreted 
uniformly, where they  do not explicitly provide room for interpretation by the Member States72, 
even when they are optional73. The interpretation must respect the principles of neutrality  and equal 
treatment and take into account relevant  case law but most of all, observe the literal wording, 
context and purpose of provisions interpreted. Concepts of EU law have an autonomous meaning74 
different from the meaning in MS national laws and in the highly harmonised areas of law, such as 
VAT law, uniform interpretation is pivotal to guaranteeing effective maintenance of the VAT system. 
Uniformity of interpretation ensures that  problems deriving from divergent implementation of 
provisions are either tackled straight away by  removing interpretative mismatches or later, when 
uniform interpretation proves to be insufficient, by  helping to identify areas in which legislative 
action is required and inspiring legislative changes. Now, we will investigate whether the proper 
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interpretation of art.11 can help  us solve problems with VAT grouping listed in section 3 and if not, 
which problems need to be addressed by other means. 
Section 4.6 summarised what the preferred meaning of “any persons” is. There are no theoretical 
impediments to making VAT groups as open as possible. However, even though proper 
interpretation of the expression and art.11 offers solutions to some of the pertinent problems 
regarding VAT groups there are limitations to interpretation which call for legislative action to 
improve the working of the provision. Here, the author will look whether problems identified in 
section 3 can be solved by applying proper interpretation of art.11 and later, will present issues 
which require further redress.
5.1. Territoriality: Cross-border VAT groups 
Although the interpretation of the terms ‘person’ or “any persons” for the purposes of art.11 RVD 
does not directly inform us about the meaning of ‘establishment’ within the meaning of the article it 
still has the capacity  to influence the way we prefer it to be understood. A ‘person’ in VAT law is 
viewed in terms of its dependency while ‘establishment’ is a function of a person. A ‘person’ can 
transcend national boundaries, have legal personality or not but  most importantly, does not use the 
concept of ‘establishment’ to define itself. It  permeates from the VAT Directive that VAT group 
regulation must conform to ordinary rules laid down in the Directive and case law of the ECJ, 
especially the judgement in FCE Bank. It is also supported by  the fundamental Treaty freedoms and 
the principle of neutrality  that VAT group legislation does not privilege those taxpayers which 
operate on purely domestic basis than those which act  cross-border. Therefore, against the 
Commission’s guidance, it follows that VAT groups ought to include foreign branches/FEs of 
companies established in the MS which exercised its freedom to transpose art.11 RVD. Such 
reading of a ‘person’ in VAT law clears out the doubt about the extent to which FCE Bank should be 
implemented and answers once and for all, that VAT groups ought to function cross border, 
especially in light  of the evidence that VAT group regulations have a spill over effects which the 
territoriality criterium was meant to address but failed epically. 
This is however not to say that cross-border VAT groups are not going to be problematic in their 
own right. Cross-border VAT grouping will render a choice not to permit VAT groups obsolete as 
FE held by a head office which entered a VAT group will have to be recognised by the MS as a 
member of the group. This double standard -- recognising that domestic branches of foreign head 
offices can form groups while domestic branches of domestic head offices cannot -- although still 
compatible with fundamental freedoms, will de facto force MS to recognise VAT groups against 
their will. On the practical side the things issues regarding mutual recognition of deductions and 
exemptions will militate against  making VAT groups a fully  workable structures. On top of that 
could groups could be used in avoidance or opportunistic channelling of services that might or 
might not include countries outside the EU. The exact  implications of cross-border VAT groups 
need to be studied in great detail in a separate text but some solutions to problems foreseen might 
be available off the cuff. MS might introduce a deemed supply rule e.g. to redress situations in 
which a VAT group involves a member from outside the EU. Australia already  does that by 
preserving Worldwide GST grouping while maintaining a rule that deems transactions from/to a 
foreign entity as taxable supplies75. Moreover, it would be practicable to use a single deduction rate 
for the whole group  to mitigate against channelling services from countries with a low deduction 
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rate to a country with a high deduction rate. Those are just the two examples of how further 
legislative action might be involved once it is accepted that the judgement in FCE Bank  is to be 
fully  embraced. Authors furnish further suggestions how the cross-border groups can be improved 
and/or transformed76. 
5.2. Voluntary nature
Analysing art.11 proved to be insufficient to resolve the issues related to the mode of registration of 
VAT groups. It remains in MS’ discretion to introduce a compulsory or voluntary  group registration. 
It follows however from the spirit of the EU as manifested in the FCE Bank  case and from the 
general logic of VAT that a) companies should be able to establish abroad either by  the way of 
primary or secondary establishment, b) divergencies in application of EU law, especially in highly 
harmonised areas such as VAT, are unwelcome because they distort internal market and undermine 
the principle of neutrality  both on domestic and international scale. Therefore, we can draw a 
conclusion that it is preferred that  VAT group become mandatory in those MS which transposed art.
11 into their national law. It would be moreover suggested that all MS adopt art.11 to stop tax 
competition and prevent infringements of national sovereignty caused by the (inevitable) spill-over 
effects of art.11.  
In the event that VAT group registration becomes compulsory/automatic upon meeting further 
connective criteria from art.11 it becomes necessary to brace for and take legislative steps to 
address the following: a) VAT groups might become too big and/or difficult to manage, b) certain 
FEs might be automatically registered in two groups, c) problems regarding inadequately or 
vaguely defined “financial, economic and organisational links” which undermine legal certainty, d) 
problems with recognition of deductions. 
5.3. Sectoral approach
The recent developments in ECJ case law in Commission v Sweden confirm what is clear from the 
terminology  used in art.11 which prohibits any sectoral selectivity. “Any persons” within the 
meaning of the directive might come from different walks of business, as both literal, historical and 
purposive interpretations indicate. It is thus preferred that MS cease to implement art.11 selectively 
as it runs counter to the provision and the principle of neutrality.
5.4. Connectivity
The analysis of the expression “any persons” shows that the legislator attempted to realise the 
‘substance over form’ principle. To achieve that a ‘person’ should be widely understood to 
accommodate the sheer variety of circumstances and legal arrangements taxpayers can enter into to 
organise their affairs and capture what could have been concealed in legal hurdles. From a 
theoretical viewpoint it should be irrelevant how the taxpayer structures his business, no legal 
technicality should break the connection between the organically  connected parties. “Any persons” 
does not presuppose the immediate connection which is why from a theoretical standpoint foreign 
FEs of a head office which belongs to a VAT group should in principle be included in the economic 
link test. It is however not without relevance that allowing potentially indefinitely  long chains of 
connections undermines the aim to simplify  VAT administration process, a core purpose behind the 
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provision itself. So even though it  would be more theoretically cohesive the common sense points 
of the conclusion that  it is enough that persons can group together, as opposed to having to gather 
all the remotest, yet connected persons all over the EU. In conclusion, it is strongly suggested that 
the economic test from art.11 is elaborated on in greater detail to inform taxpayers, especially those 
who will face compulsory group registration. This might come at  the expense of sacrificing the 
ideal of real control over the company but it enhances legal certainty. 
6. Summary and Conclusions
It is conceivable that  VAT groups are not  the most effective way  to deal with cooperation between 
connected parties. Some authors argue that European VAT should follow the Canadian example77 
and uniformly  apply the art.132(1)(f) RVD exemption to cooperating companies instead of 
continuing to tolerate the faulty  grouping provision. However, despite the problems generated by 
the current form of art.11 it is possible to bring VAT group to their full potential either by 
interpreting terminology in line with the general system of VAT or by adding new provisions to 
redress the remaining problems. 
This paper has argued that the expression “any persons” should be interpreted widely  for the 
purposes of the VAT Directive. Looking at the art.11 from the perspective of the preferred meaning 
of the expression it is clear that VAT groups should include foreign FEs of the members of the 
group and not be limited to any  sector. It is preferred that  when a MS exercises the VAT grouping 
option he does introduce compulsory registration but also takes precautions to avert the problems 
related to registration of groups which are too big to handle and promptly executes art.11(2) which 
encourages MS to adopt anti-avoidance measures. In light of the aforementioned the connective 
factors between groups should be laid out as clearly  and precisely; FEs and foreign FEs should not 
be included in the connectivity  test. Issues not resolved by preferred interpretation of art.11 can be 
address by  the exercise of the deemed supply rule (issues related to the exercise of cross-border 
groups) or, in case of abuse, caught by the Halifax case.  
29
77 A. Parolini et al. “VAT and Group Companies”, Bulletin for International Taxation, June 2011, p.360;
Bibliography
Cases:
Case C-283/81 CILFIT
Case C‑174/08 NCC Construction Danmark
Case C-162/07 Ampliscientifica
Case C-7/13 Skandia America Corporation;
Case C-475/01 Commission v. Greece (Ouzo)
Case C-137/92 Commission v. BASF and Others 
Case C-245/92 Chemie Linz v. Commission 
Case C-210/04 FCE Bank
Case C-260/95 DFDS
Case C‑85/11 Commission v Ireland
Case C-480/10 Commission v Sweden
Case C-23/98 Heerma
Case C-25/03 HE
Case C-97/09 Schmelz
Case C-8/03 BBL
Case C-400/98 Brigitte Breitsohl
Case C-363/05 JP Morgan
Case C-179/04 Abbey National
Case C-8/01 Taksatorringen
Case C-472/03 Arthur Andersen
Case C‑242/08 Swiss Re
Case C-240/99 Skandia
Case C-296/95 EMU Tabac
Case C-255/02 Halifax
Case C-60-90 Polysar
Dutch Supreme Court, 12 June 2002, case No. 35976 (IVM 6 (2002)
Opinion of Advocate General Jaaskinen delivered on 27 November 2012 Case C‑480/10 
Commission v Kingdom of Sweden
Literature:
C. Amand, “VAT Grouping, FCE Bank and Force of Attraction - the Internal Market is Leaking”, 
International VAT Monitor, July/August 2007, pp.237-249;
C. Amand, “Cross-Border Entities and EU VAT: A Contradictory Concept?”, International VAT 
Monitor, January/February 2010, pp.20-24;
L. Bijl et al. “EU VAT Grouping Provisions: Update”, Issue 5, August 2012, pp. 32-35;
C. Bjerregaard Eskildsen, “VAT Grouping versus Freedom of Establishment”, EC Tax Rev. 2011-3, 
pp.114-120;
30
CFE Opinion on the Consequences of the ECJ Interpretation of the VAT Treatment of Transactions 
Between Head Offices and Branches (C-210/04, FCE Bank). Paper submitted by the Confederation 
Fiscale Europeenne to the European Institutions in 2008, European Taxation, January 2009, pp.
32-33;
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the VAT 
group option provided for in Article 11 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system 
of value added tax Brussels, 2.7.2009 COM(2009) 325 final;
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the future of VAT Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient 
VAT system tailored to the single market Brussels, 6.12.2011 COM(2011) 851 final;
O. Henkow, “Neutrality of VAT for taxable persons: a new approach in European VAT?”, EC Tax 
Review 2008/5, pp.233-240;
H. Kogels, “Making VAT as Neutral as Possible”, EC Tax Review 2012/5, pp.220-223;
I. Massin and K. Vyncke, “EC Communication on VAT Grouping: An Attempt to Harmonize or to 
Restrict the Use of Group Registration?”, International VAT Monitor, November/December 2009, 
pp.454-461;
E. Matyszewska, “Grupa VAT ulatwi rozliczenia”, Gazeta Prawna, 18.11.2011;
A. Parolini et al. “VAT and Group Companies”, Bulletin for International Taxation, June 2011, pp.
349-362;
Proposal of 14 April 1965 for a Second Directive for the harmonization among Member States of 
turnover tax legislation, concerning the form and the methods of application of the common system 
of taxation on value added;
T. Rzepa and M. Wyganowski, “VAT Grouping and Cost-Sharing Agreements - The Polish 
Experience”, International VAT Monitor, July/August 2012, pp.252-257;
J. Swinkles, “The Phenomenon of VAT Groups under EU Law and Their VAT-Saving Aspects”, 
International VAT Monitor, January/February 2010, pp.36-42;
J. Szoùno-Koguc, “The EC Standards in the Scope of Value Added Tax”, VIEÐOJI POLITIKA IR 
ADMINISTRAVIMAS, 2006/15, pp.68-75;
B. Terra and J. Kajus, 2011, A Guide to the European VAT Directives. Introduction to European 
VAT. Vol 1. Amsterdam/Hornbaek: IBFD;
A. van Doesum et al. “Internal Market and VAT: Intra-group Transactions of Branches, Subsidiaries 
and VAT Groups”, EC Tax. Rev. 2007/1, pp.34-43;
H. van Arendouk, S. Jansen, R. van der Paardt (eds.), VAT in an EU and International Perspective: 
Essays in honour of Han Kogels, Amsterdam/Hornbaek: IBFD;
31
K. Vyncke, “EU VAT Grouping from a Comparative Tax Law Perspective”, EC Tax Review 2009/6, 
pp.299-309;
K. Vyncke, “VAT Grouping in the European Union: Purposes and Limitations”, International VAT 
Monitor, July/August 2007, pp.250-261;
R. Zuidgeest, “Cross-Border VAT Grouping”, International VAT Monitor, January/February 2010, 
pp.25-30;
32
